周波：为什么中国(guo)不忧郁特朗普再任(ren)美国(guo)总统,拜登,政府(fu),对(dui)华政策

特朗普借"墨(mo)西哥总统求救济"打击拜登

2017年特朗普就任(ren)总统后，美国(guo)对(dui)华政策发生了180度(du)大转变，但其主要(yao)遗产(chan)并非拜登上台后以“去风险”的(de)名(ming)义延续的(de)特朗普提出的(de)“脱钩”政策，而是两党在意识形态范畴构(gou)成的(de)反华共鸣(ming)。

弄虚(xu)作假，特朗普并非意识形态的(de)拥(yong)趸。但是，双边干系一(yi)旦被意识形态所绑架，灵活处置(zhi)的(de)空间就会急(ji)剧(ju)缩(suo)小。特朗普会改变立场吗？美国(guo)前总统尼克(ke)松倒是个绝佳案例。尼克(ke)松曾经是铁杆的(de)反共右翼分子，但他最(zui)为人们称道(dao)的(de)却是对(dui)华破(po)冰之旅。

不过，尼克(ke)松被公认为战略(lue)家，而特朗普只是个自(zi)高自(zi)大的(de)“交易者”。特朗普在他的(de)第一(yi)本自(zi)传《经商的(de)艺术》中写道(dao)：“我经商的(de)方式简(jian)朴又直接。我给自(zi)己设定(ding)很高的(de)目标，然后一(yi)点点加码，直到乐成。”

具有讽刺意味的(de)是，这种策略(lue)似乎对(dui)美国(guo)的(de)盟友更加奏效。特朗普曾表示，他勉励俄罗斯对(dui)任(ren)何未履行军费开支义务的(de)北约国(guo)家“为所欲为”，这一(yi)言论使得美国(guo)的(de)盟友们惊愕失措。

如果特朗普赢下第二个任(ren)期，险些能够确定(ding)，更多北约成员国(guo)将加速完(wan)成国(guo)防支出占(zhan)国(guo)内临盆总值(zhi)2%的(de)目标，以免最(zui)坏的(de)情况发生——美国(guo)加入北约。如果特朗普的(de)政策是一(yi)根“大棒”，那(na)么其结果远胜(sheng)于拜登的(de)“胡萝卜”。

但是，这根“大棒”对(dui)中国(guo)毫无作用(yong)。特朗普曾放言对(dui)中国(guo)商品征收60%或更高的(de)关(guan)税(shui)。但这一(yi)措施将会使美国(guo)对(dui)华入口份(fen)额增添至近趋于零，在华的(de)美国(guo)制造业(ye)将蒙受重创，美国(guo)金融市(shi)场将涌(yong)现动(dong)荡，美国(guo)人将不能不为入口商品支付(fu)更高的(de)价格。

能够预见，特朗普在限制高科技流向中国(guo)方面，与拜登政府(fu)的(de) “小院高墙”政策不会有很大区分。但是，两人都无法制止环球的(de)高科技人才，包括在美国(guo)接受过教诲的(de)技术人才流向中国(guo)。中国(guo)政府(fu)正在大范围投资创新，2022年，中国(guo)的(de)专利请求数量甚至超过了天下其他国(guo)家总和。

中国(guo)政府(fu)的(de)主要(yao)关(guan)切是，特朗普对(dui)台湾问(wen)题的(de)立场是否会有所不同。与拜登不同，特朗普从未公开表示过要(yao) “保卫台湾”，但中国(guo)政府(fu)不会掉以轻心。2022年，南希·佩洛西窜访(fang)台湾后，中国(guo)人民(min)解放军在台湾岛周边海域进行了实弹演习。中国(guo)政府(fu)的(de)应对(dui)措施必将随着挑战的(de)升(sheng)级而升(sheng)级，每次应对(dui)，都会创造新的(de)现状。如今，不论台湾当局(ju)如何抗议(yi)，中国(guo)军机都会定(ding)期穿越台海中线(xian)。

特朗普的(de)对(dui)华政策还取决(jue)于他如何得到国(guo)内和国(guo)际支撑。客岁，ABC旧事/益(yi)普索(Ipsos)的(de)民(min)意调查显(xian)示，四分之三的(de)美国(guo)人认为美国(guo)正在朝着毛病的(de)方向进展。一(yi)个分裂的(de)美国(guo)绝不可能拥(yong)有强有力的(de)外交。

乌克(ke)兰冲突和中东战争， 必将分散(san)下一(yi)任(ren)美国(guo)总统对(dui)北京的(de)注意力。 特朗普宣称，如果他再次当选总统，能够在一(yi)天以内解决(jue)俄乌冲突。这是特朗普式的(de)自(zi)吹自(zi)擂，但也(ye)说(shuo)明华盛顿对(dui)基辅的(de)支撑才是解决(jue)冲突的(de)关(guan)键。

尽管得到了北约的(de)全力支撑，乌克(ke)兰的(de)抨(peng)击照(zhao)样以失败告终，失去了夺回所有失地的(de)希望，而俄罗斯则不能不忍耐一(yi)个扩大的(de)北约。俄乌冲突最(zui)有可能的(de)结果，是在欧(ou)洲中心肠带杀青一(yi)项无人中意的(de)停火协议(yi)。

在中东，特朗普最(zui)重要(yao)的(de)外交造诣—旨(zhi)在改进以色列与几个阿拉伯国(guo)家干系的(de)《亚伯拉罕协议(yi)》已被束之高阁。拜登与以色列总理内塔尼亚胡干系冷淡，而特朗普则不同，在与内塔尼亚胡任(ren)期重叠的(de)四年间，两人是最(zui)为亲(qin)密的(de)政治(zhi)盟友。与拜登比拟，特朗普会让以色列更撒手一(yi)搏，无论这会加剧(ju)多少地区冲突。

如果特朗普再度(du)当选，伊朗核(he)问(wen)题只会更加恶化。停止目前，德黑(hei)兰尚未做出临盆核(he)弹的(de)政治(zhi)决(jue)意，但中东局(ju)势越动(dong)荡，伊朗开发核(he)弹的(de)诱(you)惑就越大。伊朗已加快临盆60%浓度(du)浓缩(suo)铀(you)的(de)速度(du)，很快就能够将60%的(de)浓度(du)提升(sheng)至临盆核(he)弹所需的(de)90%浓度(du)。沙特阿拉伯威胁称，如果伊朗开发核(he)弹，沙特阿拉伯也(ye)将制造核(he)弹。

（乌克(ke)兰和中东）这两场战争的(de)输家不仅是征战各方，还包括美国(guo)。美国(guo)对(dui)乌克(ke)兰和加沙问(wen)题采(cai)取的(de)截然相反的(de)两重尺(chi)度(du)，使其公信力和道(dao)德权威所剩(sheng)无几。环球南方国(guo)家也(ye)广泛对(dui)美国(guo)的(de)极端虚(xu)伪进行了批判。这种损(sun)害(hai)很难修复(fu)，尤其在国(guo)家领导(dao)人是一(yi)名(ming)并不在意人心向背的(de) “交易者”的(de)情况下。

如果特朗普再次当选总统，议(yi)员格林（Marjorie Taylor Greene）所言的(de)“国(guo)家大离婚”景象会进一(yi)步加剧(ju)。无论谁成为下一(yi)任(ren)美国(guo)总统，都将会发现美国(guo)越来越难以推(tui)广所谓的(de)“基于法则的(de)国(guo)际秩序”； 认同所谓的(de)“民(min)主与专制对(dui)决(jue)”的(de)环球南方国(guo)家寥寥无几；甚至美国(guo)的(de)盟友也(ye)不愿意选边站；会有更多的(de)事情需要(yao)与中国(guo)讨论合(he)作。

那(na)么，中国(guo)有什么好忧郁的(de)呢？

英文原文：

With Donald Trump pulling slightly ahead of Joe Biden in some national polls as the US prepares to vote for its next president, what might America’s China policy look like if Trump is reelected? My answer is simple: a Trump 2.0 administration will look a lot like Biden’s.

America’s China policy took a U-turn when Trump became president in 2017. But his major legacy is not decoupling – which Biden has continued in the name of “de-risking”. It is something ideological: a bipartisan consensus against China that has taken root.

To be fair, Trump is not an ideologist. But once bilateral relations are hijacked by ideology, the room for flexibility drastically shrinks. Can Trump break camp? A good example is Richard Nixon. Once a diehard anti-communist rightist, the former US president is best remembered for his icebreaking trip to China.

Nixon, however, is well-recognised as a strategist while Trump is a self-satisfied “deal-maker”. In his first book, Trump: The Art of the Deal, he wrote: “My style of deal-making is quite simple and straightforward. I aim very high, and then I just keep pushing and pushing to get what I’m after.”

Such a strategy, ironically, seems to work best on American allies. They are appalled by his remarks that he would encourage the Russians to “do whatever the hell they want” to any Nato country that doesn’t fulfil its financial obligations to the military alliance.

Should Trump win a second term, it is almost certain that more Nato members would hurry to meet the target defence spending of 2 per cent of gross domestic product so as to avoid the worst-case scenario – America’s withdrawal from Nato. If this is a stick, it is expected to work much better than Biden’s carrot.

It won’t work on China, though. Trump has threatened to place a tariff of 60 per cent or more on all Chinese imports. But this would slash the share of US imports from China to near-zero. US manufacturers in China would take a hit. US financial markets would tumble. And Americans would pay higher prices for imports from elsewhere.

Therefore, Trump wouldn’t differ very much from Biden and his administration’s “small yard, high fence” restrictions on the flow of key technologies to China. But neither man can stem the flow of global, including US-trained, tech talent to China. Beijing is making massive investments in innovation and, in 2022, China filed for more intellectual property than the rest of the world combined.

Would Trump make a difference on the Taiwan issue, Beijing’s primary concern? Unlike Biden, Trump has never openly vowed to defend Taiwan. But Beijing won’t be complacent. Nancy Pelosi’s Taiwan visit in 2022 triggered People’s Liberation Army live-fire drills around the island. Beijing’s reaction has to increase with each provocation and each reaction will create a new status quo. Now Chinese military jets regularly fly over the Taiwan Strait’s median line regardless of the Taiwanese authorities’ protests.

Trump’s China policy would also depend on how he could garner domestic and international support. An ABC News/Ipsos poll last year found that three-quarters of Americans believe the country is heading in the wrong direction. A divided America simply cannot have robust diplomacy.

The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East will surely distract the next American president from Beijing. Trump claims that, as president, he could end the Russian-Ukraine war in a day. This is self-praise, but also telling that it is Washington’s support for Kyiv that is the key to resolving the conflict.

Ukraine, having failed in a counteroffensive fully supported by Nato, has lost hope of taking back all lost territories while Russia will have to bear with an enlarged Nato. The most likely outcome is an armistice in the heart of Europe that no one likes.

In the Middle East, Trump’s most significant diplomatic achievement, the Abraham Accords that aims to improve relations between Israel and several Arab countries, has been squandered. Unlike Biden who has frosty relations with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump was Netanyahu’s closest political ally during the four years they overlapped in office. He could give Israel a freer hand than Biden, however much that stirs up regional conflict.

Iran’s nuclear issue would only worsen with another Trump presidency. So far, Tehran hasn’t made the political decision to produce a nuclear bomb, but the more turbulent the Middle East, the more attractive it will be for Iranians to do that. It has already sped up its production of 60 per cent enriched uranium. It can quickly upgrade this to the 90 per cent needed for a nuclear bomb. Saudi Arabia has pledged to create a nuclear bomb if Iran does.

The losers in the two wars are not just the warring parties. It also includes the United States, which has very much lost its credibility and moral authority thanks to the double standards in its contrasting responses to Ukraine and Gaza. Such glaring hypocrisy is widely criticised in the Global South. The damage cannot be easily repaired, particularly by a deal-maker who doesn’t give a damn about winning hearts and minds.

That Trump may once again be president will further speed up what US representative Marjorie Taylor Greene calls the “national divorce”. Whoever becomes the next president will find it harder to sell the so-called rules-based international order, will find few countries in the Global South wishing to buy into the “democracy vs autocracy” divide, will find even America’s allies reluctant to take sides, and will have a longer to-do list to discuss with Beijing. Then, why should China worry?

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特朗普借"墨(mo)西哥总统求救济"打击拜登